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In the Supreme Court of the Stale of Utah 
AHMORED MOTORS SERVICE, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, DONALD HACKING, 
HALS. BENNETT AND DONALD 
'l'. ADAMS, COMMISSIONERS OF 
'l11IE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMIS-
fll ON O:F' UTAH, AND FRANK J. 
DBA BUS EXPRESS 
PICKUP AND DELIVERY SERV-
ICE CO., 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
Case No. 
11672 
OF KIND OF CASE 
This case involves an application to the Utah Public 
SPrvice Commission by the defendant Frank J. Terry, 
dha Bus Express Pickup and Delivery Service Co., for a 
Cnrti ficate of Convenience and Necessity which originally 
rontt>mplated operations a:s a common carrier by motor 
rd1ice for the transportation of packages not to exceed 
:if) pounds per package between all points and places 
within Salt Lake, Davis, Utah, and Weber Counties, State 
of Ftah. 
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DISPOSITION OF THE CASE 
By its order dated March 7, 1969, the Public Service 
Commission of Utah granted to Frank J. Terry dba Bus 
Express Pickup and Delivery Service Co., a Certificate 
of Public Convenience and Necessity authorizing Mr. 
Terry to operate as a common carrier in intrastate com-
merce, as follows: 
Transportation of general commodities by 
motor vehicle over irregular routes between all 
points and places in Salt Lake County, and all 
points and places in the area of Davis County sonth ' 
of the Junction of U.S. Highways 89 and 91 
north of Farmington, Utah, save and except that 
there is excluded from said area that part of 8alt 
Lake County which lies west of 4800 West and 
south of 1300 South hut tlw an'a to be served shall 
include the town of Kearns, Utah; provided fur-
ther, that no service shall be rendered in the trans-
portation of any package or article 'veighing more 
than 50 pounds or exceeding 108 inches in length 
and girth combined, and each package or articlf' 
shall be considered as a separate and distinct ship-
ment; and pro,-ided further, that no service shall 
be provided in the transportation of packages or 
articles weighing in the aggregate more than 100 
pounds from one consignor at one location to one 
consignee at one location on any one day; and 
Restricted against the transportation of: ( 1) 
papers, document:",, and written instrn-
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ments as are used in the conduct and operation 
of banks and banking institutions; (2) of papers 
used in the processing of data by computing ma-
chines, punch cards, magnetic encoded documents 
and office records, and (3) of eye glasses, frames, 
lenses, optical, camera, and hearing aid supplies. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 
Plaintiff Armored Motors Service seeks this Court's 
order setting aside the Commission order granting the 
said Certificate of Convenience and Necessity to def end-
ant Frank J. Terry. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant Frank J. Terry made application to the 
Public Service Commission of Utah on June 12, 1968 
t>eeking intra and interstate motor carrier authority for 
the transportation of "packages, not to exceed 50 pounds 
per package, between all points and places within Salt 
Lake, Davis, Utah, and Weber Counties, State of Utah." 
(R 428) 
At the commencement of the hearing on the applica-
tion, the area of Utah County was eliminated from the 
scope of the authority sought so as to eliminate the threat 
of a protest by the Continental Bus System Companies, 
Palmer Brothers, Incorporated and Rio Grande Motor-
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ways (R 14). At that time the application was also vol-
untarily restricted against the transportation of com-
mercial papers, documents, and written instruments as 
are used in the condnct and operation of banks and bank-
ing institution, certain computer supplies, and certain 
optical and hearing aid equipment and supplies. This 
restriction eliminiated the protest of Bankers Dispatch 
Corporation (R 8). 
Then, aftt>r the testimony of the first 22 shipper 
witnesses who appeared at the hearing had been taken 
and only one shipper ·witness was yet to testify, the ap-
plication was again voluntarily restricted as to the area 
to be sen-ed, the size of the packages to he hauled and 
the total weight of the shipments allo-wahle. It 1rns also 
agreed that no interntate traffic was to be hauled. rrhese 
restrictions were made so as to eliminatP the protest of 
Cole Transfer and Ogden Transfer and Stor-
age, Redman Moving and Storage Company, Barton 
'rruck Lines, l\fagna Garfield Truck Lines, Wycoff 
Company, Incorporated and Lake Shore Motor Coach 
Lines (R. 375-378). The area which was eliminated from 
the scope of the application at that time was all of 
\Veber County, all of Davis County north of the junc-
tion of U.S. Highway 89 and 91 just north of Farming-
ton, Utah, and that portion of Sat Lake County which 
lies west of 4800 ·w<'st and south of 1300 South, except 
for Kearns, Utah. The size of any packag0 or articlr 
to be transporkd by applicant was restricted to a total 
of 108 inches in length and girth eornliined and tlw aggrt>-
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gate of any one shipment between any one consignor 
at one location to any one consignee at one location on 
any one day was restricted to 100 pounds. (R. 376) The 
100 pound per shipment restriction was in addition to the 
;JO pound per package restriction contained in the ori-
ginal application. 
the specific interest of plaintiff Armored 
Service was not eliminated by the above describ-
l'd restrictions, it remained as a protestant in the Com-
mission proceedings, cross-examined the final shipper 
wii.JH·ss and presentro evidence in support of its protest. 
'L'he applicant, Frank Terry, is a full-time bus driver 
for Continental Bus Company. (R. 397) In addition, 
lw operates a business which he calls Bus Express 
Pickup & Delivery Service Company. This business 
inrnlves transportation within Salt Lake County 
of packages to and from bus tenninals and parcel post to 
and from post offices. He also has contract carrier au-
thority to transport commodities for General Motors 
Parts Depot in North Salt Lake to bus depots in Salt Lake 
County. ( R 35) Mr. Terry's motor carrier service has 
hPm operated out of his home with the assistance of 
!tis wife (R. 97). His financial statements as of the end 
of I 9G7 show that his motor carrier operations were not 
profitable and that at the time of the hearing he showed 
a ll(c'gative earned surplus of $3,000.00 in spite of the fact 
that neither he nor his wife had taken any compensation 
t1llt of the busine;;s for their services (R. 396). Mr. Terry 
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admitted that his past service involving the delivery of 
packages directly from the consignor to the consignee was 
"prohibitive costwise" (R 47). 
At the commencement of the commission hearing, Mr. 
Terry testified that he proposed to expand his present 
operations to serve all points in a three county area and 
to provide two separate types of service combined under 
the same operation. On the one hand, he proposed a dir-
ect delivery service which contemplates the picking up 
of a package at the business or home of the consignor 
and taking that package directly to the consignee without 
other stops or reshuffling of freights (R 40). On the 1 
other hand, he intended to initiate what 8hall be referred 
to herein as a redistribution type service. The redistribu-
tion type service would involve the picking up packages 
from various consignors within a given area and taking 
them to a warehouse where they would be redistributed 
with freight arriving in vehicles from other areas and 
reloaded for delivery in other vehicle the follwing a .. m. 
or p.m. (R 41). 
For the redistribution type service the applicant 
proposed to charge a tariff rate ranging from 55c on a 
package weighing up to 9 pounds to 85c for a package 
weighing up to 50 pounds for the first package, plus an 
additional flat rate of lOc for each additional package up 
to 10 packages and a flat rate of $1.00 per package for 
each additional package over 10 packages (R 50-51). On 
the direct delivery type service applicant proposed to 
'{ 
charge the same rate as the charge for the redistribution 
type service plus an additional 30c for packages mov-
ing within the same county area, an additional $2.00 for 
packages moving between two adjacent counties and an 
additional $3.00 for packages moving between two non-
adjacent counties ( R75-76). 
'l'he applicant claimed to have made a study or sm-
VPY with foe aid of a friend as to the economical feasibility 
of the new service which he proposes, but no written study 
ur survey was placed into evidence for examination and 
applicant's friend did not testify. In connection with this 
stndy, the applicant made no analysis as to cost per trip 
or cost per mile (R 98-99), and he admitted that he had 
no written or binding lease or purchase agreement for 
the warehouse facility out of which he proposed to oper-
atr• (R 102-103). 
The applicant placed into evidence a balance sheet 
his financial condition as of November 1, 1968 
(Exhibit 1, R 455) from which it was ascertained upon 
cross-examination that the accounts and notes receivable 
figure of $566.00 constituted a five year old unpaid loan 
to a brother (R 80), that the accounts and notes 'receivable 
-doubtful figure of $400.00 was probably not collectible 
(R 81), that the asset designated as "operating author-
ity" in the amount of $3,000.00 was actually the expense 
incurred by Mr. Terry in obtaining his past operating 
authorities (R 94), that the $950.00 liability figure desig-
nated as notes payable to relatives constituted a four year 
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old unpaid obligation of the applicant (R 94), and that 
all assets of the appicant, including r0al t'state, anto-
mohiles, and et1uipment were mortgagPd on hank loans or 
pledged to the Small Bnsiness Administration on a prior 
husirwss loan (R s;n. 
The applicant estimated tlmt his initial cost in thl' 
first year of 01wration nnd<'r his proposed servic<' would 
n•quire a $GO,OOO.OO innstrnent in n<'W vehicles (R 40-±). 
Ile admitt0d that his financial condition was such thathe 
was not in a position to lmrro,,- lllOm·y (R :-\7-88). 
Most of the testimony of supporting shipper witness-
es related to their alleged need for service to points out-
side of the territory encompassed in the application m; 
finally restricted and granted by the Co1mnission and 
almost withont excPption the wi tnc'sses admitted that 
their support of the application \YUS based upon the fact 
that the proposed rates to be charged hy the applicant 
,,-ere lower than ratPs available from other existing 
carriers. The appendix which follows this brief eonsists 
of an abstract of the h'stimony of supporting :;hipper 
witness as that testimony relafrd to the witnes8's need for 
sen-ice within the area for which authority ,,-as finally 
granted the Commission l>lns tlw mamwr in \d1ielt tlw 
flp])lieant':-; proposed rates induePd his support of tl1<' n1 1 
]Jlication and the knowledge of the 1\-itn<'ss a:-; to otlwr 
available puhlic cnrri('r servicPs which ]H' ('ould 
The ahstract is not int rnkd to he a compl('tc> srn11 
mnry of all tPstimony. 
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The plaintiff Armored Motors Service is best known 
as a carrier of coin, currency and other valuables in 
annored vehicles. This service is conducted in several 
states and in Utah under an exemption in the Motor 
Carrier Act. In addition, Armored has been conducting 
a package delivery service in Salt Lake County. Author-
ity for this service was acquired from Jiffy Messenger 
Service pursuant to approval of the Public Service 
Commission dated November 23, 1966 (R 412). This 
authority authorizes the plaintiff to operate at a "com-
mon carrier by motor vehicle of property in intrastate 
eommerce, to and from all points in Salt Lake County, 
Utah, over irregular routes, for the transportation of 
mE>ssages and packages not exceeding a weight of 100 
ponnds per item." (Exhibt 4, R 462) 
obtaining its package authority, plaintiff insti-
tutt>d a county-wide package delivery service. In doing so, 
it employed additional personnel and it purchased five 
additional Econovan vehicles specifically adapted for 
the package delivery type service (R 414, Exhibits 5 and 
6). It employed a traffic solicitor (R 414), distributed 
advertising material (R 417 and Exhibit 7), and com-
menced contacting businesses throughout the county area 
to determine the feasibility of a major distribution type 
operation (R 416, 421 & 423). However, it was determined 
that there was not a sufficient volume of traffic in the 
arpa to make feasible, an inunediate full-scale redistribu-
tion type operation ( R 417). 
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Plaintiff's package delivny service, consists of both 
a direct deliY<'l'Y seryice which n•quires at most one honr 
of transportation time from tlw consignor to the consign-
ee (R 415) plus a r<>distribntion type service which results 
in following day ddiven- (R 41G, 427) .. The hnsine:,,;s is 
c·onducted thrnugh a terminal and dispatcher locatl>d in 
Salt Lake Cit>- (H 415). It clid not show a profit during 
Pith<·r of th<' two Yl'ars of its op<>ration up to tlw timP of 
the ]1(•aring, hut the volume has lwc>n increasing (H -l-:!4, 
S). 'L'he plaintiff's witness (•stimatPs that about a 
:2() per cent incn•asP in YO)HllW will fW TI<'Ce::;sary to gPt 
t.JH• Operation ''into tJiP hlack" ( n 4:2:1). 
POINT I 
THE RECORD CONTAINS N"O SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE OF A PUBLIC NEED FOR THE AP-
PLICANT'S PROPOSED SERVICE. 
The record clearl>- shows that the shipper witnesses 
who testified at t110 Commission hearing in support of t11r 
application wPre }Jrimarily interestPd in se1Tic<> to arpas 
which are beyond the scope of the avplication as finally 
restriefrd and granted and it fnrtlwr clParly sltow8 that 
the witnPsse8 induced to support the application h.v 
the promis<' of the applicant's proposc•d cliea1wr rates. 
Furiht'rmore, th<' rPcord shff\\"":,; tliat all of thP stated 
nPPds of the 8npporting shiprwrs ean be nd<><ptat<'ly met 
ll:\ tli<· i1rc•'..;ently <·xistin,g pnliliC' motor c::uri<•r 
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'l'wenty-two of the twenty-three shippers who sup-
port<'d this application did so under the false assumption 
that the applicant's operations would involve a three 
<'nnnty-wide package distrbution service with only a 
iJO ponnd weight per package limitations and certain 
co1m11odity restrictions. A review of the record 
that those witnesses were primarily interested in 
from Salt Lake City to Weber ,County and speci-
fically into the City of Ogden. Also, because the interest 
of most of the original protestants to the application cen-
ten•d around the W eher County area, the focus of both 
(lin'ct and cross-examination "·as on the proposPd inter 
county service, and the witnesses showed only passing 
interest, if any at all, in the local delin1ry service for 
w!tieh authority was finally requested and granted. As 
a eonsPquence, the testimony as to need for the local 
delivery service was onl)· handled as an incidental and 
Jle>ripheral issue. 
Furthermore, all of the said 22 supporting witnesses 
wrre cross-examined under the misunderstanding that the 
drfondant was offering a complete service over at least 
three full counties. Had both the witnesses and the 
protPstants known of the very limited area which was to 
hr finally requested and then approved by the Commis-
'ion, the testimony would in all probability have been 
Pntirely different, and the shipper's support of the ap-
pl iC'ation would have been extremely questionable. A 
n·view of the record shows that most of the supporting 
12 
witnesses were not intereted in a package delivery service 
within portions of Salt Lake and South Davis Counties 
since they had their own local delivery equipment and 
they did not intend to abandon their private local delivery 
The record is further ck)ar that the chief inducement 
for any of the witnesses to support the application was 
the applicant's proffered lower rate structure. The ap-
plicant admitted that he had discussed his proposed rates 
with the witnesses and committed himself rate-wise to 
them (R 70-71). The witnesses were quite candid in ad-
mitting that their support of the application was predi-
cated upon the applicant's ability to offer them rates 
which were either equal to or lower than the present 
parcel post rates or the cost of their private transporta-
tion. Yet, the record sho\vs that the applicant's proposed 
rates are not economically feasible as will be discussed 
under Point II of this briPf and thus the whole basis of 
snpport by the shipper witnesses fails. 
It has been a long standing rule of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission in common motor carrier applica-
tion proceedings that if the primary advantage to be 
gained by the proposed service is a lower rate, the appli· 
cation will be denied. (White, Extention of Operations, 
14 MCC 25) The reason for such a rule is obvious. Any-
one offering lower rates can muster substantial support 
for his proposed service even though the identical service 
is already available. Since it is in the public interest that 
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1·xisting regulated carriers should be allowed to charge 
compensable rates in order to secure their continued op-
L·rations and service to the public, the function of regu-
lating rates has been assigned to the Commission. Thus 
l'V!'n if it is maintained that the rates charged by existing 
:,;ervices are too high, that fact alone would not justify 
the granting of new duplicating authority since any un-
lawful. rates can be corrected by the Commission. (See 
Fleet Transport Company of Kentuck:v, Inc., Extension, 
SS MCC 762.) In fact, it would appear that the primary 
purpose of rate regulation by the Commission is to elimi-
nate cutthroat price competition so as to securP the sta-
hility of existing Sl'lTices and to insure their continued 
to the pnhli<'. 
An ('lement to lw considered by the Commis-
in determining whPtlier or not public convenience 
an<l necessity exists for a new proposed service is whether 
or not the public is afforded sufficient existing transpor-
tation facilties of the type proposed. The Utah Public 
Service Commission is specifically charged with consider-
ing this issue by the terms of Section 54-6-5 Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 which states in part: "Before granting 
a certificate to a common motor carrier, the cormnission 
flhall take into consideration ... the existing transporta-
tion facilities in the territory proposed to be served." 
It is abundantly clear from the record in this case 
that the public is already afforded a completely adequate 
]lnhlic transportation service for the transpo-rtation of 
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small packages. The area description finally adopted by 
the applicant was that contained in the typical local car-
tage authorities presently held by numerous othPr com-
panies. The applicant himself admitted that he was 
aware that this same authority had be0n issued by the 
Commission to 20 different other people or companie:-
and that 10 additional cartage companies had authorih 
which duplicated his applied for authority at least in part 
(R 405). 
"-as no tPstimony presented to the effect that 
u<lt•qnafr common carrier in Nalt Lake County 
was not available. The testimony of the witnesses was 
:,;imply that tlwy werP SPPking a sPrvice with lower rateF. 
The commission clearly erred in its finding that 
"there is not presently any authorized common carrier 
who is actively atfrmpting to render service of the type 
proposed." (R 493) Since most of the protesting carriers 
withdrew from the Commission proceeding prior to the 
presentation of their own evidence, the record does not 
contain much detail as to their offen•d servicPs, but it can 
he ascPrtained from the t0stimony of the supporting ship-
Jl<'rs that a semi-local small package dPlinry is offered 
sevPral existing carriers. Mr. Pemhroke testified that 
his is presPntly using tlw services of 
City D(•linry Service, Moving and Storage Com-
pany, and 'Vycoff Incorporated for delivery 
of his packag<>s into Salt Lake and Davis Counties (R 301-
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and Mr. Foster who testified on behalf of the L.D.S. 
t'linn·.h admitted that his use of plaintiff's delivery serv-
ier· had hN•n satisfactory (R 218). 
Since plaintiff did remain in the Commission pro-
ce('ding as a protestant, the record does contain evidence 
that plaintiff is conducting a package delivery service 
11 i lhin 8alt Lake Connty almost identical to the type 
1d1i('h the applicant proposes. The applicant admitted 
that he would probably not he able to immediately con-
duct a full-scale high volnme package service but that the 
business would liave to grow into 1vhat he ultimately 
pro11oses (R 86). This is exactly what the plaintiff has 
IJl'en attempting to do since the inception of its service in 
latP 19GG (R 41G-417). 
'I'he applicant attempted to induce the belief that the 
type of service which he proposes is somehow unique in 
that it contemplates in part the redistribution of packages 
at a warehouse. Not only does the record show that the 
Jilaintiff engages in this type of service but the applicant 
aihnitted that with respect to the method of handling the 
shipment his propos<-'d operation would be no different 
than that of the other regular common carriers (R 66). 
fn Hildition, l\Ir. Dodge who testified on behalf of Westf'rn 
Company, referred to this same type of re-
l'ling system off erecl by ·wycoff Company, Incorpo-
1 a h·d (R 17<i). 
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As a practical matter, both tlw plaintiff's present 
service and tlw applicant's proposed service are substan-
tially identical. Both have roving vans in communication 
with a dispatch service; plaintiff operates on a G a.rn. 
to G p.m. schedule, six days a wed{, while the applicant 
would operate on a 7 a.rn. to 8 p.m. schedule, six days 
per and plaintiff has a consolidation service for 
non-rush order items such as the applicant propose:;; to 
establish in his warehouse. In essl'nce, both services are 
<·ssentially based upon the United Parct>l Service idea. 
Admittedly, the Commission is not under a statutory 
duty to prevent all competition, but the Commission did 
error as noted above in its finding that no presently au-
thorized common carrier is actively attempting to render 
the type service which is proposed, and the Commission 
further ignored the obvious effect which the diversion of 
traffic from the plaintiff's operation would have on the 
plaintiff's ability to continue in its efforts to establish 
the precise type of service which the Commission feels is 
needed. 
Mr. DeLue of Armored Motors Service testified that 
his studies slmwed that he could expect a loss 
operation for at lPast fin because of the expensivr 
natnrP of the direct delivery service and the initial low 
vohune which could genC'rated for the redistribution 
type service. Inspite of this, he entered the field anrl 
estahlislwd his opt>ration in late HHHI. As expected, the 
17 
operation showed a loss for both years during which he 
operated prior to the Commission hearing, but with a 
substantial increase in gross revenue being generated 
d nring that period ( R 421-422). In other words, the plain-
tiff forsaw the initial expense and difficulty involved in 
<>stahlishing a full-scale package delivery service in the 
Lake Metropolitan area, but he entert>d the field 
anyway and ·was, until the granting of this application, 
on his way toward establishing such a service. 
If the applicant is allowed to Pnter the field in compe-
tition with the plaintiff, substantial traffic, both present 
and potential, will obviously be diverted from the plain-
tiff, and the plaintiff's efforts to develoii a full-scale and 
economical serTice will fail. The Commission's conclusion 
that "it does not appear that the proposed service would 
l'esult in any substantial divt•rsion of traffic from the 
authorized carriers, but that the traffic tendered would 
he in lieu of private transportation or parcel post," can't 
possibly be based upon either the record or the realities of 
husiness life. Since the applicant proposes to offer 
the same service as the plaintiff but at lower rates, diver-
sion of traffic from the plaintiff is a foregone conclusion. 
Shippers ·will always use the cheaper service, all other 
things being equal. 
With respect to diversion, the probable effect of 
gTanting this authority would be to split the available 
lrni'fic bdween the two carriers, both of which are 
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attempting to establish the same type of service, and 
thus make it impossible for either to economically es-
tablish the public service which the Commission is ap-
parently convinced is needed. Certainly if one package 
delivery service in Salt Lake Connty cannot yet gen-
Prate sufficient volume to make a profit, the addition 
of another such service will simply impose upon the 
lmhlic another loss operation. Such cannot be said to 
he in the public interest or of public convenience and 
necessity. 
1'his court has both the legal prerogative and the 
duty to overrule the Commission's order when it is 
found to be arbitrary and capricious. This court exer-
cised that prerogative in the case of Lakeshore Motor 
Coach Lines vs. Hal S. Bennett, et al., 8 Utah 2nd 293, 
333 P .2d 1061 ( 1958). In that case the court made cer-
tain statements which seem to fit the fact situation in 
the instant cas<>. 1'his court stated at page 1063: 
" ... Proving that public convenience and ne-
cessity would be served by granting additional 
carrier authority means something more than 
showing the mere generality that some members 
of the public would like and on occasion use 
such type of transportation service. In any pop-
ulous area it is easy enough to procure 
who will say that tl1ev would like to see more 
frequent and cheaper· service. That alone 
not prove that public convenience and 
so require. Our understanding of the statute is 
that there should he a showing that Pxistini; 
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services are in some measure inadequate, or that 
public need as to the potential of business is such 
that there is some reasonable basis in the evi-
dence to believe that public convenience and ne-
cessity justify the additional proposed service. 
For the rule to be otherwise would ignore the 
provisions of the statute; and also would make 
meaningless the holding of formal hearings to 
make such determinations and render futile ef-
forts of existing carriers to def end their operat-
ing rights." (emphasis added) 
Likewise under Interstate Commerce Commission 
law, it is well-established that in order to foster sound 
economic conditions in the motor carrier industry, ex-
isting motor carriers should nonnally be afforded the 
right to transrJort all traffic which tl1ey can handle 
adequately, and economically in the territories 
s0rved by them, as against any person now seeking to 
enter the field. (See Squaw Transit Company, common 
<·arrier application 48 MCC 17 and J. T. Transport Com-
pany, Inc., extension 79 MCC 695) 
By granting this application, the Corrrmission has 
arbitrarily ignored the true public interest. The public 
interest dictates that the plaintiff's efforts to develop 
a proftable and serviceable package delivery service in 
Salt Lake County should receive protection from un-
warranted and unnt>eded competition. 
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The record does not contain any substantial evi-
dence whatever which establishes a need for the service 
which the applicant proposes. Not only does almost all 
of the testimony relate to service into areas not now 
within the scope of the authority granted, but it is 
abundantly clear that public support of the application 
eame as a result, not of inadequate existing services, but 
rather through the promise by thc> applicant of a cut-rate 
servicP. Therefore, the order of the Commission grant-
ing the applicant his requested authority was an arbi-
trary and cavricions act and entire!)- beyond the lawful 
discretionary powers granted to the Commission by 
statute. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SH 0 W S 
THAT APPLICANT'S PROPOSED SERVICE IS NOT 
ECONOMICALLY FEASIBLE. 
Since the rates which the applicant proposes to 
charge in connection with his new package delivery 
service are significant!)· lower than rates charged by 
other existing package delivery services in this area, it 
was incurnhent upon thP applicant to show that his pro-
posed service is economieall:· feasible. This he has failed 
to do. In fact, a elose of the evidence of record 
shows that the rates proposed hy the applicant are not 
r<>alistic and would result in devastating losses. 
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At the outset it should be observed that the ap-
licant did not attempt to show that his proposed rates 
were feasible by direct evidence. Any specific figures 
n·lativn to revenues and costs were elicited by cross-
(•x:amination. Whereas the applicant claimed to have 
made a study relative to the feasibility of his proposed 
service, nothing ·was presented in writing from which 
tlw accuracy or authenticity of the study could be de-
termined (R 91) and it became evident through cross-
(•xamination of Mr. Terry that his estimates were pure 
gtH'sses. For example, Mr. 'l'<•rry admitted that he would 
have to purchase a forklift, hut the record shows that 
la• had not investigated the cost of a fork-
lift (R 61, 78). Also, Mr. Terry admitted that he had not 
attPmpted to det<>1·mine his cost on either a cost per 
mile or cost per package basis (R 98, 99). He proposes 
to operate out of a warehouse facility in Salt Lake 
County at a rental cost of per month, although 
he has no binding lease agreement and he admitted that 
the reasonable value of the rent on such a facility is 
$900.00 per month (R 102-103). 
Even if one were to blindly accept that the applicant 
had made a proper study of the feasibility of his pro-
posed service and rate structure, the findings of such a 
became entirely irrelevant when the applicant 
<·hose to restrict his application against transportation 
to most of the area originally contemplated since the 
economic feasibility of the large redistribution type 
proposed <l<'pends upon the degree of volume of 
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traffic which can be generated. '11he applicant's original 
study was for a service as stated in the original ap-
plication. It contemplated traffic from Weber County, 
North Davis County, and all of Salt Lake County which 
is not now available (R 398). Likewise, the study con-
templated the handling of traffic ·with no per-shipment 
weight restriction. 'l'hat restriction limited a volume of 
expected traffic. The applicant testified that his pro-
JJOsed service conhm1plated a bns express service in 
Ogden hut that JJOrtion of his proposal is also now nn-
a,·ailable to him. Tlrns the applicant has not made any 
n·liahlP stn<ly to show that he can in fact profitably 
operate his proposed service at the rates which he 
proposes and upon which the shipper witnesses based 
their support. 
Other than haying simply failed to demonstrate 
the economic feasibility of his proposed service, appli-
cant produced evidence through himself and 
through his shipper \\itnesses which shows rather con-
clusively that his proposed service and rate structure is 
not economically feasible. The applicant himself esti-
mated that his revrnm• nnder his proposed rates would 
awragP 55¢ per paclrnge (R 84). The applicant did not 
1>ro,·ide cost iwr package figure but the applicant's 
shippPr witness from Professional Pharmacy testified 
as to his cost Pxperience in connection with his own 
service and hP stated tliat he ex1wrienced a cost 
of approximately $1.00 per dPlivpn· t•ven though he uses 
coll('gP stndents working pad-tim(• n+ a lwf.("inning rate of 
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$1.25 per hour as drivers and even though his vehicles 
consist of a small foreign car and an American compact 
car as opposed to the larger truck vehicles which the ap-
plicant would use (R 239-241). In addition, Mr. Snow 
from Z.C.M.I., who testified on behalf of the applicant, 
statPd that his cost per delivery in connection with the 
Z.C.M.I. delivery system was between 50c and 75c just 
for the vehicle and its driver and not including any 
o\·Prhead expenses (R 337). 
Thus, if we are to rely upon the revenue and cost 
per package figures presented as a part of the appli-
cant's evidence, we can determine that the proposed 
service will most likely cost almost twice as much as the 
traffic will produce in revenue. 
As to the direct delivery portion of the applicant's 
proposed service, the applicant's evidence likewise dem-
onstrates the probability of a loss operation. Pursuant 
to cross-examination, the applicant admitted that his 
tariff for a direct delivery of a package from Salt Lake 
City to Farmington, Utah would be about $2.60, 
as his cost ·would be about $4.50 (R 403-404). 
Plaintiff submits that the Commission acted arbi-
trarily in not properly considering the economical feasi-
l1ilit)· of the applicant's proposed service based upon the 
<'\ idence of record. Admittedly, it is not possible for 
the Commission to guarantee the financial success of any 
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newly proposed operation let alone existing operations, 
but where the record shows, as it does here, that the 
proposed service is based and supported almost entirely 
upon a drastic reduction in rates to be charged, the Com-
mission has a duty to determine whether or not the 
service as a whole is feasible and if the evidence shows, 
as plaintiff believes it does here, that such a service is 
not feasible, then the Commission is remiss in its duties 
to the public in granting the authority sought. 
Certainly the applicant, and the public, as well as 
the plaintiff, will be darnaged by allowing the applicant 
to initiate his riroposed service. 'l'he applicant's whole 
proposal for service is admittedly based upon the United 
Parc('l Service concept whid1 operates in larger 
population areas in the country (R 115). Yet, United 
Parcel has the en tin' accounts of large department stores 
(R 92), and the applicant has no commitment 
for such traffic in this area. In fact, the witness from 
Z.C.M.I. expressed doubts that it would ever be able to 
switch to the use of the applicant's services entirely. 
Obviously now that the applicant has substantially re-
duced the area into which he is to operate, his service 
hecomPs of even more limited value to the large depart-
ment stores who handle deliveries into areas beyond the 
applicant's te.rritory. 
POINT III 
THE APPLICANT FAILED TO SHOW THAT HE 
IS FINANCIALLY ABLE TO RENDER THE SER-
VICE WHICH HE PROPOSES. 
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Another one of the specific elements of a public con-
wni<>nce and necessity case which the Commis-sion is 
directed to consider by the terms of Section 54-6-5 Utah 
Cod<'. Annotated 1953, is the financial ability of the appli-
cant. The statute reads in part: "Before granting a 
cntificate to a corrunon motor carrier, the Commission 
shall take into consideration the financial ability of the 
applicant to properly perform the service sought under 
the certificate ... " Likewise, this court has specifically 
l1eld in the case of Utah Light and Traction Company 
I'. Pu7Jlic Service Commission 101 Utah 99, 118 P.2d 683, 
that the Connnission must consider the matter of the 
financial ability of the applicant. At page 689, the court 
stated "that under the law, the Commission should not 
issue a certificate to a party financially unable to per-
form the service permitted. . . " Yet, in the instant 
proceeding the Commission has totally ignored the issue 
of the applicant's financial ability to perform his pro-
posed service. Nothing is contained in the Commission's 
Report and Order on the subject, in spite of the fact 
that it became one of the principal contested issues at 
the h0aring. 
The evidence clearly shows that the applicant is not 
capable of financing his proposed service. Upon cross-
('Xarnination it was shown that his balance sheet (Exhibit 
1) containE>d listed assets of a rather questionable nature 
and it was further shown that since all of the assets 
WPre pledged to other loans, the applicant had no borrow-
ing power. In fact, the applicant candidly admitted that 
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lie could not get a loan ( R 87-88). The applicant had no 
commitment from any bank or the Small Business Ad-
ministration for a loan to finance his operation (R 404). 
His only possible source of funds were "friends" none 
of whom were identified or committed to the investment. 
Certainly the fact that the applicant had on his 
books an unpaid obligation of $950.00 which had been 
ontstanding for four years, plns the showing of a loss 
operation in his past carrier business could not be of 
any assistanc<> to him in his search for funds. The ap-
plicant admitted. that ]w would incur an initial cost for 
truck eqnipnwnt of ahont $GU,000 in the first year, but 
he did not show where he \ms going to get the funds to 
cover that cost (R 40-1:). 
The purpose of having the Commission pass upon 
the financial ability of an applicant is obvious. To allow 
the initiation of under-financed public services would be 
detrimental to the public interest. Plaintiff submits that 
the Commission's failure to make any finding on the 
issue of the applicant's fitness leaves undetermined an 
essential issue which should have been determined and 
that by granting the applicant the anthority without a 
proper finding of fitness was beyond the authority of the 
Commission and tlrns a basis for this court to set aside 
the Commission order. 
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POINT IV 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ORDER 
WAS NOT BASED UPON A PROPER AND LAWFUL 
CONSIDERATION OF THE EVIDENCE. 
As can be ascertained by a review of the record 
and as counsel for the defendant Frank Terry will un-
doubtedly admit, the Public Service Corrunission hearing 
in tltis case was conducted by a hearing examiner with 
on!)' one> of the commissioners sitting in to hear the 
l'Yidt-nce. Although the transcript of record shows that 
both Commissioners Hacking and Adams were present 
at the hearing when it commenced, only Commissioner 
Adams remained for the hearing. This fact can be de-
duced by the notation in the record at page 82 to the 
t>ffect that Commissioner Hacking had reentered the 
hearing room. He remained at the hearing only temp-
orarily howevn. 
At the close of the hearing, the examiner stated 
that the matter would be taken under advisement. There-
after, the Commission issued it own report and order 
on March 7, 1969 without ever having obtained or re-
view<>d a of the transcript. A transcript of evi-
dence was never prepared until ordered by the plain-
tiff pursuant to this proceeding before this Court. Thus 
thP decision of the 1Commission in this case was ar-
hitrarilY bast>d upon the opinion of the hearing ex-
aminPr. or the commissioner who attended the hearing. 
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It could not have been based upon any review of the 
evidence by a majority of the commissioners. 
Plaintiff submits that in any proceeding before the 
Commission where a hearing is held, it is mandatory 
that a majority of the commissioners review the evi-
dence either by personally attending the hearing or by 
reviewing a transcript of the evidence before a decision 
is made. Section G4-1-3 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amendPd, pro,·ides in part: 
" A majority of the commissioners shall 
constitute a quorum for the transaction of any 
business, for the performance of any duty or 
for the exercise of any power of the commission; 
and may hold hParings at any time or place with-
in or without the state, and any action taken by 
a majority of the commission shall be deemed the 
action of the Commission . . . Any investigation, 
inquiry, or hearing which the Commission has 
power to undertake or to hold may be undertaken 
or held by or before any commissioner or an 
examiner appointed by the commission. All in-
vestigations, inquiries, and hearings by a com-
missioner or an examiner appointed by the com-
mission shall be deemed the investigations, in-
quiries, and hearings of the commission; and all 
findings, orders or decisions madP by a commis-
sioner or an examiner appointed by the commis-
sion, ichcn appro'l'l'd a11d confirmed by the com-
mission and filed in its office, shall be deemed 
the findings, orders, or decisions of the commis-
sion and shall have tlrn samP c•ff ect as if originally 
madP by the commission." ( <·rnphasis addPd) 
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Plaintiff recognizes that Section 54-1-3 Utah Code 
cbmotated 1953 provides that the Commission may util-
ize one commissioner or an examiner to conduct its 
hearings. That statute, however, does not allow the one 
commissioner or the examiner to make the ultimate de-
cision in any case. The Commission is an appointed body 
\\'ith the responsibility of acting in response to the needs 
of the public and Section 54-1-3 reserves to the entire 
Commission the right of issuing the final decision or 
order in each case. The section provides that all find-
ings, orders, and decisions made by an examiner become 
the order of the Commission only "when approved and 
confirmed by the commission". It is axiomatic that the 
Commission cannot "approve and confirm" and exam-
inPr's recommendation unless it can review a transcript 
of the evidence upon which the recommendation is based 
anymore than this court is capable of properly review-
ing and either setting aside or affirming the order of 
the Commission without the aid of a transcript. 
This matter is not new to the Commission or to 
this court. In the recent case of Lewis Bros. Stages, Inc., 
et al. vs. Puhlic Service Commission, et al., 22 Utah 2d 
452 P .2d 318, decided on March 24, 1969, this Court 
sPt aside the order of the Commission which granted 
Wycoff Company, Incorporated certain motor carrier 
a11tltority and ordered the Commission to complete and 
l'<'Yiew a transcript of the evidence before issuing an 
onler. Plaintiff submits that there is no significant 
llifforence between the procedure of the Commission in 
30 
that case and the instant case. It is essential to funda-
mental principles of justice that whenever an admini-
strative body utilizes the services of a hearing examiner 
in connection with its judicial function, a transcript of 
the evidence must be made available to those officers 
of the administrative body charged with the responsi-
bility of making the ultimate findings and issuing th<> 
ultimate order. 
It is the practice before the Interstate Commerce 
Commission that where a hearing examiner is utilized, 
a transcript of the hearing is prepared for review by 
the body authorized to make the ultimate decision. This 
procedure is not ne\\r nor is it foHowed just by federal 
agencies. T11t> proper use of hearing examiners is wrll-
established and is in fact a procedure used by the Utah 
Industrial Commission relative to workman's compen-
sation hearings. The Industrial Commission follows the 
<:•stablished practice of obtaining a transcript of hearings 
for bv the Commissioners in any case heard by 
either an examiner or by one of the commissioners. In 
addition, this writer has had the recent opportunity of 
participating in proceedings before the Wyoming Public 
Service Commission and it \YaS noted that that com-
mission also follows the standard practice of requiring 
a transcript of the hearing to be prepared in advance of 
any decision hy that commission. 
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Thus the practice of securing a transcript of the 
1•vidence prior to an ultimate decision by the Commission 
1rhere the services of a hearing examiner are utilized is 
not uncommon or unreasonable. If anything, it results 
in a more accurate and reasonable decision at the Com-
mission level and it probably reduces the number of 
eases brought before this Court involving a review of the 
Commission's orders. But more than being desirable, 
it is essential to fairness. An order approved by the 
rnajority of the Commissioners, without the opportunity 
to review the transcript of evidence in cases where a 
hearing examiner is utilized, obviously is arbitrary and 
tlw true decision-making function of the Commission 
is abandoned. 
A proper comparison of the instant case with a 
court proceeding would be a case where a jury assigns 
to a third person, the duty of hearing the evidence and 
then telling the jury how to decide the case. In such an 
instance, this Court would have little difficulty in find-
ing that the jury had not properly assumed its function 
and that the legal right to trial by jury had been denied. 
It is just as logic.al for this Court to find that the 
Public Service Commission, the legally authorized tryer 
of fact, cannot assign to a third person its responsibility 
to ultimately decide the case. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff submits that the order of the Commission 
(·ntere<l in this case on March 7, 1969 is arbitrary and 
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capricious and not supported by substantial evidence. 
The record clearly shows that there was no real public 
support for a package delivery service in the area of 
that portion of Salt Lake and South Davis Counties for 
which the applicant was nltimately granted authority, 
since 22 of the 23 supporting shipper witnesses testified 
·with the false understanding that the services of the 
applicant would be a three county wide service and their 
stated need for service was primarily into areas not now 
C'overed by the granted certificate. 
The reeord also shows that the shipper witnesses 
,,·ere induced to testify in support of the application by a 
promise of low<,r rates than those of existing carriers, 
not hecanse there was any dt:>ficiency in the services of 
presently authorized carriPrs. 
In addition, the Commission arbitrarily ignored the 
evidence with respect to the economical feasibility and 
the financial fitness of the applicants since a careful 
review of the record shows rather conclusively that the 
applicant's proposed service is not economically feasible 
nor is the applicant possessed of sufficient assets or 
credit to properly estahlish and finance his proposed 
operation. 
Finally the Commission's order is arbitrary and 
capricious and not based upon the evidence since the 
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majority of the Commissioners have never had the op-
portunity to review the evidence. 
Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to set aside 
the Commission order. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Stuart L. Poehnan of 
Worsley, Snow & Christensen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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APPENDIX 
ABSTRACT OF SHIPPER 
"WITNESS TESTIMONY 
1. Martin Gladowski - Regional Sign Company, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. Testimony related to service from 
Salt Lake City to Ogden. No discussion was had as to 
need in Salt Lake and Davis Counties. The wit-
He1:l1:l admitted that his needs had been met, but ''they 
('oul<l he met at a more economically (sic) price." (R 127) 
'.2 Jay Winger - Sperry-Rand Corporation, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. Mr. \Vinger stated that his company 
has a fleet of approximately 15 trucks in operation for 
<lPlivery service. As to service within the Salt Lake City 
area, applicant's proposed service would only be used 
on an emergency basis after 3 :00 p.m. (R 141-142) As 
to local deliveries, he stated that the company's own 
tnick service would be discontinued only if defendant's 
l'inally-published rates were lower than Sperry-Rand 
( 'orporation could possibly run their own trucks (R 135, 
L ±0, 143). Wlwn asked if the Armored Motors delivery 
'''rYice had been satisfactory, Mr. "Winger stated spe-
riLca1ly one instance on October 30, 1968, that delivery 
took 24 hours (R 144-146). Later, Mr. DeLue of the 
Armored Motor Service testified that he made an in-
wstigation into the aforementioned delay and discovered 
that th0 drivrr who would have made the delivery was 
in tliP hospital and that Sperry-Rand had been informed 
ri[' tJ1P conf'eqnent delay. (T 422) 
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3. Neil B. Peterson - Homelite, North Salt Lake, 
Utah. Mr. Peterson stated that practically all of his ship-
ments are outbound with most of them going into other 
states and very little local business (R 151). He stated 
that Wycoff service is "very, very good," and parcel 
post service was convenient to him and "very good." His 
only support of the application was for a cheaper method 
of getting packages from his business to the bus depol 
(R 152) 
4. Richard "\V. Crouch - Carr Printing Company, 
Bountiful, Utah. Mr. Crouch stated that his company 
now delivers with its own truck. He indicated that Wy-
coff service had been used with good results (R 160), 
but the proposed rates by defendant would be a "major 
factor" in his support of this application (R 162). 
5. Al C. Dodge - vV estern Electric, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. Mr. Dodge stated that his company now uses 
Telephone Company trucks for 95 percent of shipments 
within Salt Lake, Davis and Weber Counties (R 169). 
The main testimony concerned delivery from the West-
ern Electric plant in Salt Lake to Weber County and 
specifically Ogden, Mr. Dodge admitting that his only 
need was for direct delivery on an emergency basis since 
Wycoff has a reshuffling system and offers otherwise 
satisfactory service (R 176). He also stated that on 
emergency shipments within Salt Lake City that Redman 
and other cartage carriers in the area have given satis-
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factory service, although lw objected to their cost as 
comparecl with defendant's proposed rates (R 173). 
(i. Walter G. Koplin - Salt Lake Hardware, Salt 
Lak<> City, Utah. Koplin stated that within the 
Un·nter 8alt Lake area that his company delivered on 
t!JPir own truck. Ile statecl that presf'nt services in the 
an'a met his needs, "except for the cost." (R 189) Mr. 
Koplin 's primary concern as evidenced throughout his 
"·as that of cost. 
7. Edward L. Evans - Strevell-Patterson Hard-
ware and Motor :Mere, Salt Lake City, Utah. Mr. Evans 
stated that the company's own vehicles are used in the 
;-)alt Lake area. His testimony in the main concerned 
dt•liveries into the Ogden area. However, he stated that 
within Salt Lake County he has used ·wycoff Company 
rlPJi,·eries, hut "the rates that he has proposed here 
would probably cause us to ship most of the small pack-
ages under this 50-pound rate by Terry. In most cases 
it 'Xould divert from ·wycoff service or the bus service." 
(R 202) Mr. Evans stated that he definitely was not 
t·1msidering the discontinuance of use of his own trucks 
in this area, even for delivery of small packages. (R 
8. Bobby Lee Foster - L.D.S. Church, Salt Lake 
Utah. Mr. Fostf'r stated that the Church presently 
11st•s its own trucks and does not intend to eliminate 
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them and that his support of the application is con-
tingent upon the rates to be charged by the applicant. 
His testimony was : 
"Q. So, when it finally gets down to the nutcrack-
ing, we get do"\\rn to the rate 
A. Well, that is true. 
Q. And if the rate structure he proposes is not 
approved by the Commission, then your sup-
port of his application fails? 
A. Well, taking all things into consideration, if 
his rate structure fails, then his whole pro-
gram fails, doesn't iU 
Q. Correct. And your support fails; isn't that 
A. Well, that is true." (R 216) 
As to service, Mr. Foster readily admitted that de-
livery within the Salt Lake City area by Delivery Ser-
vice (Armored Motors Pickup and Delivery Service) has 
been both direct and fast (R 218). 
9. Boyd Openshaw - Fred A. Carleson Company, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. Mr. Openshaw stated that he 
hadn't attempted in past months to get same-day de-
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livery in Salt Lake County by any of the carriers 
presently serving because his company presently uses 
their own delivery truck (R 228, 230). Again, defendant's 
proposed rate was the dominating factor in inducing 
.\[r. Openshaw to testify: 
"A. Yes; this is true. This is what this brought 
to light was the cost on some of these small 
shipments in Salt Lake County, that I can't 
perform the service myself by the same cost 
as proposed in this deal he's going after. 
Q. And so in the event he is not able to per-
form this at the cost represented to you, then 
-and he would have to perform at a greater 
cost, let's say at a cost equal to what you can 
perform it yourself, then you have no need 
for his service in Salt Lake County 1 
A. If it was this high, that would be trne, I 
wouldn't need it. 
Q. And so whether or not you can actually sup-
port him depends on ultimately what the cost 
is going to be to you. 
A. Yes; that cost has a big factor in it." (R 231) 
1[r. Openshaw stated that he had not ever attempted to 
nse the Plaintiff's delivery service (R 231, 232). 
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10. John Italsano - Professional Pharmacy, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. Mr. Italsano presently makes prescrip-
tion deliveries in a small foreign car and an American 
compact car. He also utilizes college students part time 
at a beginning rate of $1.25 per hour to make his de-
liveries. ·with these economies, he stated that deliveries 
still cost him approximately $1.00 per delivery, and that 
defendant's proposed rates are still ower than the cost 
of his own delivery system. (R 239-241) It is reasonably 
inferred from l\Ir. Italsano's present operations and the 
vury nature of his hnsi:ness that only direct deliveries 
w<:>re contemplated. 
11. Arthur Holmg1en - Ipco Hospital Supply, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. Mr. Hohng-ren was interested in de-
livery into the Ogden area. He stated that he had his own 
delivery operation in the Salt Lake and Bountiful ar(•a 
and had no plans to discontinue it (R 246, 247). 
12. L. A. Marshall - Apex, Inc., Salt Lake City, 
Ctah. Mr.· Marshall was mainly desirous of speedy ser-
vice into the Ogden area (R 259). Again, this witness 
also had no intention to replace his own truck for de-
livery service in Salt Lake County, and only contem-
plated defendant's proposed service to supplement his 
own if he got into a pinch (R 269). Cost also was a major 
factor in inducing him to testify. 
13. Roger E. Mellor - Vv estnghouse Electric Sup-
ply, Salt Lake City, Utah. Mr. Mellor was primarily in-
teresh•d in the longer haul shipments. He stated that he 
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nsed his own equipment in Salt Lake County, and evi-
denced no disposition to discontinue use of such equip-
nwnt for local deliveries (R 275). Cost also was "appeal-
ing." (R 275). 
14. Raymond Peterson - Billinis Distributing, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. -When confronted with the fact that 
Wycoff service is presently available in Salt Lake County 
1vith store door pickup, if requested, Mr. Peterson stated: 
"Q. But, if that service were available as I have 
outlined, that would obviate the need for the 
Terry Service, wouldn't 
A. Well, this is right, because it is basically a 
comparable service, and they have done a fine 
job when ·we haYe nsed them." (R 286-287) 
jfr. Peterson talked in terms of service into the Ogden 
area. He owns his own trucks for delivery in the Salt 
' Lake metropolitan area. 
15. \Voodrow "\V. Marshall - Pembroke Company, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. Mr. Marshall stated that he is primarily 
interested in the Davis County area service if such ser-
vice could be purchased at a cost less than he could 
proyide it (R 295). He admitted that he would continue 
to perform his own delivery service in Salt Lake County 
unlPss defendant could provide at least comparable ser-
\'i('t' at a cheaper cost than he could perform himself (R 
). 
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16. Adrian H. Pembroke - A. H. Pembroke Com-
pany, Salt Lake City, Utah. Mr. Pembroke stated that 
he is presently using the local delivery servces of Cardall 
City Delivery Service and Eagle Moving and Storage 
Company but he desires the same type of service at a 
better rate. He expressed the desire for additional com-
petition because "His price schedule looks better than 
that we are paying now, and to be able to move to Davis 
and Weber might have some real benefits for us." (R 
301) 
17. Douglas L. Elton - Stevens-Brown Sporting 
Goods Company, Sugarhouse, Utah. Mr. Elton stated 
that his company used parcel post and sometimes their 
own salesmen deliver in Salt Lake County (R 316). He 
was not aware of anyone who offered delivery service 
within Salt Lake County, and had not used any other 
local package delivery service. (R 318-319) 
18. Gordon W. Snow - Z.C.M.I., Salt Lake City, 
Utah. Mr. Snow stated that Z.C.M.I. presently delivers 
packages from its stores in downtown Salt Lake, at the 
Cottonwood Mall in Salt Lake County, and in Ogden, 
Utah by means of its O\Vn fleet of trucks. Mr. Snow 
estimated that his cost per package per delivery was 
50-75 cents just for the vehicle and its driver, and ex-
cluding overhead expenses. (R 337) His real interest was 
defendant's proposed rate schedule. He envisioned use 
of defendant's proposed service only to handle his over-
flow deliyeries on Christmas and the like, and was un· 
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\rilling to commit himself to any complete changeover. 
(R :3:38) His testimony was given under the assumption 
that defendant could off er services into North Davis and 
Weber Counties rather than to just South Davis and 
Salt Lake Counties. Moreover, if the rates proposed by 
defendant were higher, Mr. Snow indicated his com-
pany would not be interested in the applicant's service 
(R :3:35). 
19. Steven A. Hales - Mack Trucks, Inc., North 
Salt Lake, Utah. Mr. Hales was only interested in de-
liYeries outside of Salt Lake County. 'Vhen asked if he 
had need for any kind of transportation service within 
Salt Lake County, he answered: 
"A. No, not within Salt Lake County. 
Q. And that would cover the entire county of 
Salt Lake7 
A. Yes, uh-huh." (R :344) 
20. Chris Dokas - Alernite Sales, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. l\Ir. Dokas indicated that his firm presently has 
no private delivery service. He was interested in inex-
pensive deliverv service but was not aware that any 
liacka<re delivery service was available in the city at all b • 
(It 359). Mr. Dokas therefore was not aware even of 
what other local cartage companies charged for package 
delinn-y service, but was very interested in cost con-
(R :360). 
x 
21. Mike Sergetakis - Silver State Supplier, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. Mr. Sergetakis's testimony was also 
given upon the false assumption the applicant would 
make deliveries of small packages throughout the three. 
county area in question. His support of the application 
also was because defendant's rate schedule was approxi-
mately 30 percent less, in his opinion than other carriers. 
(R 3G7) There was no cross-examination. 
22. Reginald Gmne - Rocky Mountain Machinery 
Company, Salt Lake City, Utah. Mr. Grane's testimony 
can be summed up by quoting an exchange by himself 
and Mr. Richards: 
"Q. Mr. Grane, are you the gentleman who ap-
peared in the \:Vycoff hearing? 
A. You bet. 
Q. And do you recall your testimony at that time 
that so far as Salt Lake County is concerned 
your company has no need for a transporta-
tion 
A. We have no need for it under the concept of 
a regular pickup and delivery service. If 
is something special it might be interesting. 
Now, whether it would or not, I don't lmow. 
As I say to have to call someone to comr 
out and pick something up and deliver it, I 
don't think I am interested in that, because 
we have our own picknp and delivery service. 
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Q. So that you would adhere to the same philoso-
phy today as you did in the Wycoff hearing, 
that within Salt Lake County you are not 
supporting the 
A. I am not supporting the application for Salt 
Lake County." (R 37 4-375) 
23. Harold Massett - Red Wing Shoe Company, 
Salt Lake 1City, Utah. He testified that no difficulties 
11-pre encountered with parcel post service as to rates 
(R 384, 386). He presently uses the delivery service of 
\Yycoff Company for small orders and could not say 
how the rates of -Wycoff on small packages compare to 
the applicant's rates (R 386). His support of the applica-
tion is based on the 55¢ per package rate quoted to him 
by the applicant (R 387). 
